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The average result of a weak measurement of some observable A can, under post-selection of the
measured quantum system, exceed the largest eigenvalue of A. The nature of weak measurements, as
well as the presence of post-selection and hence possible contribution of measurement-disturbance,
has led to a long-running debate about whether or not this is surprising. Here, it is shown that such
“anomalous weak values” are non-classical in a precise sense: a sufficiently weak measurement of
one constitutes a proof of contextuality. This clarifies, for example, which features must be present
(and in an experiment, verified) to demonstrate an effect with no satisfying classical explanation.
In 1988 Aharonov, Albert and Vaidman explained
“How the result of a measurement of a component of
the spin of a spin- 12 particle can turn out to be 100.” [1]
Defining the weak value of an observable A for a quan-
tum system prepared in state |ψ〉 and post-selected on
giving the first outcome of {|φ〉 〈φ| , I − |φ〉 〈φ|},
Aw =
〈φ|A|ψ〉
〈φ|ψ〉 , (1)
they exhibited a |ψ〉 and |φ〉 on a qubit for which Zw =
100. The motivation for weak values starts by consid-
ering a von Neumann model [2] of the measurement of
A. The strength of the interaction between the system
and “pointer” is then drastically reduced, such that the
pointer reading is correlated only slightly with A. The
weak value then arises as an approximation of the average
pointer reading to first order in the interaction strength.
Weak values outside the eigenvalue range of A are
termed anomalous. Aside from possible practical appli-
cations (see [3] and references therein), it has been sug-
gested that such values have foundational significance.
For example, both their theoretical prediction and exper-
imental observation are said to shed light on “quantum
paradoxes” [4–9] and even the nature of time [10].
However, there is still no consensus on the most basic
question about anomalous weak values: to what extent
do they represent a genuinely non-classical effect? The
lesser the extent, the more severe the limitations on their
practical and foundational significance.
The arguments that anomalous weak values are non-
classical have often been somewhat heuristic, appear-
ing to depend on issues such as the extent to which
weak measurements should be called measurements at all
[11, 12]. Perhaps the most rigorous evidence provided so
far is a connection between anomalous weak values and
the failure of a notion of classicality called “macroscopic
realism” [13–15]. On the other hand, classical models
have been given that reproduce various aspects of the
phenomena [16–18].
The question can be made precise by asking if anoma-
lous weak values constitute proofs of the incompatibil-
ity of quantum theory with non-contextual ontological
models [19], or equivalently [20] if anomalous weak val-
ues require negativity in all quasi-probability representa-
tions. This was conjectured to be the case in [21]. Here
I will prove it. Interestingly, the proof hinges on two is-
sues already identified in the literature: what do weak
measurements measure, and how much do they disturb
the system? It transpires that both questions have clear
answers in the setting of a non-contextual ontological
model, but the particular information-disturbance trade-
off of the weak measurements in quantum theory makes
these answers irreconcilable with the anomaly.
Let us begin by specifying exactly what is meant by
an anomalous weak value. Inspection of eq. (1) shows
that Aw need not be real even though A is Hermitian.
A complex number will certainly not be a convex com-
bination of the eigenvalues of A, and so this might be
seen as surprising. However, the imaginary part of Aw
is manifested very differently from the real part [22]. In-
deed complex weak values are easily obtained even in
the Gaussian subset of quantum mechanics, which has
weak measurements (with the same information-tradeoff
disturbance utilised here) and yet admits a very natu-
ral non-contextual model [23]. Hence I will call a weak
value Aw anomalous only when Re(Aw) is smaller than
the smallest eigenvalue of A, or larger than the largest
eigenvalue of A.
A simplification can be obtained by substituting the
spectral decomposition A =
∑
a aΠ
(a) into the RHS of
eq. (1) and taking the real part:
Re(Aw) =
∑
a
aRe
( 〈φ|Π(a)|ψ〉
〈φ|ψ〉
)
=
∑
a
aRe(Π(a)w ).
If we had 0 ≤ Re(Π(a)w ) ≤ 1 for all a then Aw could not
be anomalous. Hence an anomalous weak value for any
observable always implies an anomalous weak value for a
projector. Since
∑
aΠ
(a)
w = Iw = 1, if one projector has
Re(Π
(a)
w ) > 1 then another must have Re(Π
(a′)
w ) < 0. In
conclusion, without loss of generality we can always take
the anomalous weak value to be associated with projector
Π having Re(Πw) < 0.
I will now briefly review the relevant notion of non-
contextuality, following [19] (where the definitions are
2motivated and compared to the traditional definition
of non-contextuality due to Kochen and Specker [24]).
Assumptions of non-contextuality are constraints on an
ontological model. I will only need two notions: mea-
surement non-contextuality, and outcome determinism
for sharp measurements. (The latter can be shown to
itself follow from the assumption of preparation non-
contextuality together with some simple facts about
quantum theory, see [19, 25] for details.)
Suppose we prepare a quantum system in some way,
represented in quantum theory by a state |ψ〉. In an
ontological model the preparation is represented by a
probability distribution p(λ) over a set of ontic states
Λ. Suppose we now implement the POVM {Ek}. In a
measurement non-contextual model, this is represented
by a conditional probability distribution {p(Ek|λ)}. The
assumption of measurement non-contextuality is what al-
lows us to write p(Ek|λ) as a function of the effect Ek and
the ontic state λ only, with no dependence on other things
(“contexts”), such as the other elements of the POVM
or details of how the POVM was implemented. Outcome
determinism for sharp measurements is the assumption
that p(Π|λ) ∈ {0, 1} for all projectors Π and ontic states
λ, so that any inability to predict the outcome of a pro-
jective measurement is due purely to ignorance of λ.
The final requirement, for any ontological model, is
that when we marginalise over the ontic states, the model
must reproduce the predictions of quantum theory:
〈ψ|Ek|ψ〉 =
∫
Λ
p(Ek|λ)p(λ)dλ. (2)
We can now state the main result, identifying certain
features in the measurement of anomalous weak values
that, taken together, defy non-contextual explanation.
Theorem 1. Suppose we have states |φ〉 and |ψ〉, and a
generalized measurement [26] {Mx}x∈R, such that
1. The pre- and post-selection are non-orthogonal, i.e.
pφ := |〈φ|ψ〉|2 > 0, (3)
2. The POVM is a projector plus unbiased noise, i.e.
Ex :=M
†
xMx = pn(x− 1)Π + pn(x)Π˜ (4)
for some projector Π, Π˜ = I − Π, and probability
distribution pn(x) with median x = 0,
3. We can define a probability pd (the “probability of
disturbance”) such that
S :=
∫ ∞
−∞
M †x |φ〉 〈φ|Mxdx = (1−pd) |φ〉 〈φ|+pdEd (5)
for some POVM {Ed, I − Ed}, and
4. The values of x under the pre- and post-selection
have a negative bias that “outweighs” pd, i.e. [27]
p− :=
1
pφ
∫ 0
−∞
|〈φ |Mx |ψ〉|2 dx > 1
2
+
pd
pφ
. (6)
Then there is no measurement non-contextual ontolog-
ical model for the preparation of |ψ〉, measurement of
{Mx}, and post-selection of |φ〉 satisfying outcome de-
terminism for sharp measurements.
(Showing that operators {Mx} with these properties
actually exist whenever we have a |ψ〉, |φ〉 and Π with
Re(Πw) < 0 is a routine calculation in the theory of weak
measurement [1, 22, 28], postponed until later. Loosely
speaking, if g ≪ 1 is the strength of the measurement
then to leading order (p− − 12 ) ∼ g whereas pd ∼ g2.)
Proof. Suppose such an ontological model exists. We
can consider the weak measurement {Mx} followed by
the projective measurement {|φ〉 〈φ| , I − |φ〉 〈φ|} as one
“consolidated measurement”, represented by the POVM
{Sx} ∪ {Fx}, where Sx = M †x |φ〉 〈φ|Mx and Fx =
M †x(I − |φ〉 〈φ|)Mx. The key question is how the {Sx}
are represented in the model, because eq. (2) gives
|〈φ|Mx|ψ〉|2 = 〈ψ |Sx |ψ〉 =
∫
Λ
p(Sx|λ)p(λ)dλ. (7)
Let us consider two methods for implementing the
POVM {Ex}. By the assumption of measurement non-
contextuality they must both lead to the same p(Ex|λ).
The first method is to implement the consolidated mea-
surement and then ignore the result of the post-selection,
giving p(Ex|λ) = p(Sx|λ)+p(Fx|λ). The second method,
according to eq. (4), is to measure {Π, Π˜} and then
classically sample from pn(x − 1) or pn(x) as appropri-
ate. Hence we also have p(Ex|λ) = pn(x − 1)p(Π|λ) +
pn(x)p(Π˜|λ). Since the median of pn(x) is 0 we have∫ 0
−∞ pn(x − 1)dx ≤
∫ 0
−∞ pn(x)dx =
1
2 . Combining this
with p(Sx|λ) ≤ p(Ex|λ) from the first method, we have
∫ 0
−∞
p(Sx|λ)dx ≤
∫ 0
−∞
p(Ex|λ)dx ≤ 1
2
. (8)
Next, we apply the assumption of measurement non-
contextuality to the POVM {S, I − S}. One way to im-
plement this is to use the consolidated measurement and
ignore x, hence p(S|λ) = ∫∞−∞ p(Sx|λ)dx. A second way,
according to eq. (5), is to measure {|φ〉 〈φ| , I − |φ〉 〈φ|}
with probability 1−pd and {Ed, I−Ed} with probability
pd. Hence p(S|λ) = (1− pd)p(|φ〉 〈φ| |λ) + pdp(Ed|λ).
Finally, we calculate the model’s prediction for p−.
Using outcome determinism for the sharp measurement
{|φ〉 〈φ| , I − |φ〉 〈φ|} we can partition Λ into {Λ0,Λ1}
where p(|φ〉 〈φ| |λ) = i for λ ∈ Λi. From the above we
have that
∫ 0
−∞ p(Sx|λ)dx ≤ p(S|λ) ≤ pd on Λ0. Hence
3splitting the RHS of (7) into integrals over Λ0 and Λ1
and integrating over x < 0 gives
∫ 0
−∞
|〈φ|Mx|ψ〉|2 dx ≤
∫ 0
−∞
∫
Λ1
p(Sx|λ)p(λ)dλdx + pd.
Applying eq. (8) and recalling that (2) gives
∫
Λ1
p(λ)dλ =∫
Λ
p(|φ〉 〈φ| |λ)p(λ)dλ = |〈φ|ψ〉|2 = pφ this gives
1
pφ
∫ 0
−∞
|〈φ|Mx|ψ〉|2 dx ≤ 1
2
+
pd
pφ
. (9)
in contradiction to eq. (6).
As promised, I will now confirm that a projector Π
with Re(Πw) < 0 implies the existence of a measurement
{Mx} with the properties assumed in Theorem 1.
Similarly to [1], the measurement begins by prepar-
ing a probe system in the Gaussian state |Ψ〉 =
N
∫∞
−∞ exp(−x2/2σ2) |x〉 dx, with N = (piσ2)−1/4. This
interacts with the system via the unitary (with ~ = 1)
U = exp(−iΠP ) = exp(−iP )Π + Π˜, (10)
which defines our units of momentum and hence length,
and then the probe is projectively measured in the
{|x〉 〈x|} basis. On the system this is a generalised mea-
surement with Mx = 〈x|U |Ψ〉. Recalling that P gener-
ates translations we have
Mx = N exp
(
− (x− 1)
2
2σ2
)
Π+N exp
(
− x
2
2σ2
)
Π˜. (11)
This becomes a projective measurement in the limit
σ → 0, whereas it is known as a weak measurement for
large σ. We can now calculate
Ex =M
†
xMx = pn(x− 1)Π + pn(x)Π˜ (12)
where pn(x) = N
2 exp(−x2/σ2) has median x = 0. Re-
calling that pn(x) is normalised and defining
∆ :=
∫ ∞
−∞
√
pn(x− 1)pn(x)dx = exp
(
− 1
4σ2
)
, (13)
we obtain
S =
∫ ∞
−∞
M †x |φ〉 〈φ|Mxdx
= Π |φ〉 〈φ|Π+ Π˜ |φ〉 〈φ| Π˜ +∆(Π |φ〉 〈φ| Π˜ + Π˜ |φ〉 〈φ|Π)
=
1 +∆
2
|φ〉 〈φ|+ 1−∆
2
(Π− Π˜) |φ〉 〈φ| (Π− Π˜). (14)
Setting pd =
1−∆
2 and Ed = (Π−Π˜) |φ〉 〈φ| (Π−Π˜) (which
is a projector) we have eq. (5).
Finally we need to calculate
p− =
1
pφ
∫ 0
−∞
|〈φ|Mx|ψ〉|2 dx
= A |Πw|2 +B|Π˜w |2 + 2C Re(ΠwΠ˜∗w), (15)
where we have recalled eq. (1) and defined the integrals
A =
∫ 0
−∞
pn(x− 1)dx = 1
2
(
1− erf
(
1
σ
))
, (16)
B =
∫ 0
−∞
pn(x)dx =
1
2
, (17)
C =
∫ 0
−∞
√
pn(x− 1)pn(x)dx
=
1
2
exp
(
− 1
4σ2
)(
1− erf
(
1
2σ
))
. (18)
Expanding around 1/σ = 0 we find A ≈ 12 − 1√piσ and
C ≈ 12 − 12√piσ . Since Πw + Π˜w = Iw = 1 this gives
p− ≈ 1
2
− 1√
piσ
Re(Πw). (19)
Meanwhile to leading order pd ≈ 18σ2 . Hence, provided
Re(Πw) < 0, for sufficiently large σ we will satisfy eq. (6).
It is worth emphasising that no approximations were
made in the proof of Theorem 1, and in a concrete case
one can simply plug values of σ into the exact formulas
above to verify eq. (6).
I will conclude by outlining three interconnected
lessons from Theorem 1. The first is a classification of
how anomalous weak values could arise in an ontologi-
cal model. One possibility (perhaps the most common
realist interpretation of anomalous weak values) is that
some ontic states are pre-disposed to manifest such val-
ues, in violation of the first application of measurement
non-contextuality using eq. (4). Alternatively (along the
lines of [18]) the weak measurement may disturb the sys-
tem much more than the quantum formalism would sug-
gest, in violation of the second application. The final
possibility is that the post-selection is not represented
outcome deterministically (as in the interpretation where
the ontic state is simply the quantum state) and so fails
to identify a particular set of ontic states.
The second lesson is that a large number of aspects
of the manifestation of anomalous weak values seem to
be involved in preventing non-contextual explanation.
The “anomaly” itself is only one ingredient. Some oth-
ers may have been anticipated, such as the favourable
information-disturbance tradeoff of weak measurements.
But some seem somewhat surprising, for example the im-
portance of the post-selection being a projective measure-
ment.
The final lesson is an indication of what it would take
for an experiment involving anomalous weak values to
exclude non-contextual theories that would provide a
good classical explanation. Merely observing “anoma-
lous pointer readings” under pre- and post-selection is
far from sufficient. Most fundamentally, the experiment
must show that the probabilities in the statement of The-
orem 1 really are the probabilities of discrete events,
4rather than mere (normalised) intensities. An experi-
ment consistent with a classical field theory, so far the
most common way to observe weak values, is therefore
not sufficient [29]. One would also need to provide evi-
dence for an operational version of eqs. (4) and (5). No-
tice that these would be statements about how the weak
measurement works on all preparations, not just the one
corresponding to |ψ〉. Furthermore, one would need an
operational counterpart to the inference from preparation
non-contextuality to outcome determinism for the post-
selection measurement, perhaps by implementing prepa-
rations that make the post-selection highly predictable
(see [30] for how this can be done in more traditional
proofs of contextuality). Turning these ideas into a con-
crete experimental proposal is an interesting avenue for
future work.
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